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The main objective of this dissertation is to assess the attitudes of Brazilians towards the 
ethics of tax evasion and on a second level to analyze the influence of several socio-
demographic variables on tax ethics. 
The study of tax ethics in Brazil is relevant, given the numerous cases involving 
corruption and tax evasion, such as the Operação Lava Jato, Operação dos Zelotes, 
among others. Just to have an order of magnitude, the Brazilian Federal Reserve estimates 
that the Operação Lava Jato and Operação dos Zelotes have defrauded tax revenues of 
around 12,8 billion reais and 19 billion reais, respectively. 
To analyze this important topic, a questionnaire was carried out on topics such as the 
shadow economy problem, tax morals, institutional confidence and tax ethics. The sample 
consisted of 227 respondents from various professional areas, including finance, legal, 
marketing, health, among others. 
The results obtained indicate the existence of a high level of tax ethics among Brazilian 
taxpayers. It was possible to conclude that age and gender are determining factors for the 
level of tax ethics, with women and individuals between 30-44 years old presenting the 
highest levels of ethics, respectively.  The study also concluded that non-self-employed 
people possess the highest levels of tax ethics. 
On the other hand, it was not possible to ascertain differences between religious and non-
religious people concerning their level of tax ethics. 
It would be interesting to expand the sample, by including people with different 
educational levels, for example, as a way of completing the study of the tax ethics of 
Brazilian taxpayers. 
JEL Classification: H26 





O objetivo principal desta dissertação é avaliar as atitudes dos brasileiros em relação à 
ética da evasão fiscal e, num segundo nível, analisar a influência de diversas variáveis 
sociodemográficas na ética fiscal. 
O estudo da ética no Brasil é relevante, dados os inúmeros casos mediáticos na media 
mundial envolvendo corrupção e evasão fiscal, como a operação Lava Jato, a operação 
dos  Zelotes, entre outros. Só para se ter uma ordem de grandeza, a Receita Federal estima 
que a operação Lava Jato e a Operação dos Zelotes tenha fraudado as arrecadações fiscais 
na casa dos 12,8 biliões de reais e 19 biliões de reais, respetivamente. 
Por forma a analisar este importante tópico, foi efetuado um questionário sobre temas 
como a economia paralela, a moral tributária, confiança nas instituiçoes e ética fiscal. A 
amostra incidiu sobre 227 inquiridos de variadas áreas profissionais, nomeadamente da 
área financeira, área juridica,  marketing, saúde, entre outros. 
Os resultados obtidos indicam a existência de um elevado nível de ética fiscal dos 
contribuintes brasileiros. Foi possível concluir que a idade e o género são fatores 
determinante para o nível de ética fiscal, com as mulheres e os individuos entre os 30 e 
os 44 anos a apresentarem os maiores niveis de ética, respetivamente, o que vai de acordo 
com a maioria da literatura analisada nesta dissertação. O presente estudo permitiu 
igualmente concluir que os empregados por conta de outrem apresentam os maiores niveis 
de ética fiscal. 
Por outro lado, não foi possível constatar diferenças entre pessoas religiosas e não 
religiosas em relação ao seu nível de ética fiscal. 
De forma a ter uma imagem mais completa da ética fiscal no Brasil, seria interessante 
alargar a amostra, incluindo pessoas com diferentes níveis de escolaridade, por exemplo. 
Classificação JEL: H26  
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The problem of tax evasion is as old as the taxes themselves. Even though Benjamin 
Franklin stated that “In this world, nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes”, 
there is no doubt that there is almost always a way to avoid taxes or at least part of them. 
In the Brazilian scenario, for example, it is widespread in the population the sense that 
the tax burden is high, in comparison with the government's return to society in terms of 
public schooling, healthcare, as well as the existence of cases of government corruption, 
coupled with the desire to increase personal profits, which in turn encourages tax evasive 
behavior (Gryzybovsky & Hahn, 2006).  
Lawmakers and social scientists have recognized that tax evasion is a behavioral problem 
that threatens the government's ability to raise revenue, which is a problem that transcends 
cultural and political boundaries (Weigel et al., 1987). In addition to the problem of 
reducing government revenues, hampering their ability to settle their growing financial 
commitments, tax evasion also raises concerns about standards of conduct, as it can be 
argued that evasive behavior will have a disparaging effect on them (Groenland & 
Veldhoven, 1982). Despite growing concerns about tax evasion, as indicated by McGee, 
(2012), there are still few studies that examine non-compliance with tax obligations. 
According to the author, most studies that analyze tax evasion were conducted from an 
economic or public finance perspective, with few articles discussing the issue based on 
an ethical point of view (McGee,2012). In addition to this lack of studies on the scope of 
tax ethics, the studies already elaborated focus mostly on the American, European and 
Australian populations. Thus, the importance of this research work becomes even more 
logical, as it analyzes a country that has not been studied enough in terms of the ethics of 
tax evasion. 
1.2. Objectives 
The main objective of this dissertation is to assess the attitudes of resident taxpayers in 
Brazil towards the ethics of tax evasion. For that purpose, a survey was applied, based on 
the tax ethics literature and previous studies, mainly McGee (2006; 2012; 2014). 
On a second level, this dissertation analyzes the influence of several socio-demographic 
variables on tax ethics by identifying the factors that influence tax compliance, through 
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an application of a set of hypothesis tests, designed to investigate the existence of possible 
relationships between the variables under study and the tax attitudes and behavior of 
taxpayers. 
1.3. Dissertation Structure 
The present dissertation is organized along the lines described below: Chapter 2 aims to 
present studies related to tax compliance models based on economic theory – developed 
from the initial contributions of Becker (1968) and Allingham & Sandmo (1972). Also 
presented in Chapter 2 is the literature on social and fiscal psychology models, whose 
pioneering work was that of Schmölders (1959) – from which the concept of tax mentality 
was developed. Chapter 3 presents the research questions and hypotheses. Chapter 4 sets 
out the procedures put in place in the data collection process and the quantitative methods 
used, noting that a questionnaire survey was applied. In Chapter 5, the results obtained 
are presented and discussed, and in Chapter 6, the conclusions, limitations of the study 




2. Literature review 
2.1 Taxation and Tax Compliance: A Short Historical Review 
Since the dawn of humanity, in the face of inability to survive and evolve in isolation, 
mankind discovered the need to coexist with their peers by forming groupings, which 
gave rise to social collectivities such as tribes, clans and political societies. From the need 
to regulate common interests, the State was born (Gomes, 2006; Van Brederode, 2020). 
There is a direct link between the creation of taxes to the creation of the State itself. The 
latter, needing a whole structure for its functioning, would need funds to finance its 
activities, which would explain the need for the State to collect taxes, leading to the 
legitimation of taxation, both legally and ethically (Baleeiro, 2000). Taxes are mainly 
intended for the development of infrastructure, public services (education, health, 
security), combating poverty and guaranteeing social benefits to citizens. (Brautigman, 
2008). Taxes can also be intended to promote economic stability (e.g., preventing high 
inflation and unemployment, by creating a sound infrastructure for the development of 
business and promoting fiscal harmonization with other countries (Van Brederode, 2020). 
At the time of its origin, taxes were mainly established on an ad hoc basis, with the main 
objective of defending the realm and/or support a ruler (Van Brederode, 2020). Indeed, 
one of the first phases of taxation was the collection of excise duties and customs duties, 
both established by the Roman Empire (Devos, 2014). Subsequently, for example in the 
United Kingdom, taxation was seen as a gift of the people to the Crown. This was 
originally financed through rents paid in cash by the barons who occupied and managed 
the land belonging to the Crown. With the land privatization process, the main source of 
funding for the Crowns, which until then consisted of the respective rents, gave way to 
income and consumption taxes, which form the basis of the taxation of modern 
governments 
The Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988 possesses numerous rules and provisions that 
deal with the financial activity of the State, dealing with specific legal relationships 
arising from taxation and expenditure, the allocation of revenue, the budget, tax 
jurisdiction and its limitations. 
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2.2 Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance  
Taxpayers in general seek to reduce their tax burden. Some of these taxpayers use lawful 
but unethical and harmful to the state means, and practice tax planning and tax avoidance, 
while others opt for tax evasion, which besides being unethical and harmful to the state, 
is also illegitimate and criminal (Diogo, 2018). 
Pereira (2018) presents the concept of tax planning, a legal way to minimize taxes using 
strategies given by tax authorities, such as tax benefits and tax exemptions. 
Tax avoidance constitutes the delay, the reduction or the mischaracterization of the 
taxable event that gives rise to the payment of a tax, without, however, violating the law 
(Cowell, 1985). Therefore, all situations framed in the concept of tax avoidance are 
considered extra legem (Pereira, 2018). 
Tax evasion is both an illegal and intentional activity, aimed at reducing tax obligations, 
by either underreporting income, sales and wealth (Alm & Torgler, 2011). Slemrod 
(2007) describes it as a situation in which a person, committing fraud, pays fewer taxes 
than is obliged to. For Benk et al. (2015), tax evasion has existed since governments 
began to collect taxes, regardless of the different motivating factors. When looking at the 
topic of tax evasion, it is possible to find authors like Andreoni & Feinstein (1998), who 
claim that this is a topic that can be approached from several perspectives: it can be seen 
as a public finance problem, coercive, legal, organizational or ethical, or a combination 
of all of them. Torgler (2008) discusses tax evasion from the perspective of public 
finances but also addresses some psychological and philosophical aspects of the question. 
Tax evasion can also be approached from an ethical point of view. In this line, McGee 
(1999; 2006; 2012; 2014) carried out several studies, verifying ethical aspects related to 
withholding taxpayers from different countries, religions, ages and genders. Contrary to 
tax avoidance, all situations framed in the concept of tax evasion are considered contra 
legem (Pereira, 2018). 
2.3 Theoretical Perspectives on Tax Evasion 
The study of tax evasion has been developed from two perspectives: the theory of 
economic deterrence and the theory based on the social and fiscal psychology of taxpayers 
(Devos, 2014). The major drivers of the economic theory regarding tax evasion are 
Allingham & Sandmo (1972), Srinivasan (1973) and Yitzhaki (1974), with any of these 
works being inspired by the work of Becker (1968) on the theory of crime (Diogo, 2018). 
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On the other hand, studies in the field of social and fiscal psychology are based on 
empirical investigations that focus mainly on the moral and social values of taxpayers 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). 
In the next two subsections, it will be presented a detailed characterization of both 
perspectives regarding tax evasion. 
2.3.1. Economic Deterrence Models  
From the 1960s onwards, several studies were developed with the intent to measure 
people's behavior and attitudes towards the indicators that best define and justify tax 
evasion (Devos, 2014). The first studies are supported by Becker's model of economic 
deterrence (1968), which relates tax defaults with the cost expected by taxpayers derived 
from the penalty, sanctions and detentions triggered by non-compliance. This model 
states that the taxpayer's action comes from a rational choice to break the law, in which 
he weighs the possible gains (increase in income) and losses (the probability of being 
caught by the authorities and the inherent fines). 
Following Becker’s model, Allingham & Sandmo (1972) present an economic model 
based on both the assumptions of the utility maximization theory and the assumption that 
taxpayers possess actual knowledge of penalty and detection rates. According to this 
model, the behavior of taxpayers will be dictated by their willingness to maximize their 
expected utility, when deciding the portion of income not to be declared. This model also 
takes into account that the greater the probability of inspection and/or the probability of 
detection, the greater the probability that the taxpayer will declare all of his income. 
Allingham & Sandmo (1972) conclude that tax evasion will compensate the taxpayers 
involved if their financial gains outweigh their costs. In this regard, Tittle & Logan (1973) 
find evidence that the effect on tax compliance is more evident in a scenario of a high 
probability of inspection given the sanctions imposed. Srinivasan (1973) argues that if 
the probability of detection was independent of income, then, as taxpayers’ income 
increased, the level of evasion would also increase. 
The first sign of a real departure from Allingham and Sandmo’s model was provided by 
Yitzhaki (1974). Yitzhaki (1974) changes one of the assumptions of the AS model, by 
stating that the penalty must fall on the amount of tax corresponding to undeclared 
income. Continuing with the computation of the effect of undeclared income in the face 
of an increase in the tax rate, Yitzhaki (1974) finds that only the positive income effect 
remains, which leads to greater tax compliance. Yitzhaki (1974) also suggests that the tax 
6 
 
rate should not affect the tax evasion equation, as the penalty should increase pari passu 
with the tax rate. 
The AS model is, with the changes proposed by Yitzhaki (1974), again studied by 
Koskela (1983). This study considers the effects of progressivity and the penalties 
schemes on tax fraud, concluding that, when the penalty is on undeclared income, tax 
default increases. In turn, when the penalty is imposed on unpaid tax, the tax default 
decreases when the tax base is progressive. 
The AS model is criticized for not incorporating other relevant determinants, such as 
sociodemographic, economic and behavioral. These are studied in detail by Jackson & 
Milliron (1986). The authors identify 14 variables that influence non-compliance, 
namely: age, gender, education, occupation status, income level, income source, marginal 
tax rates, sanctions, probability of being detected, the fairness of the tax system, the 
complexity of the tax system, contact with the IRS, compliant peers and ethics or tax 
morale. 
Cowell (1985) addresses the issue of tax evasion based on its definition. The distinction 
between tax evasion and tax avoidance may be due to legal or moral issues, or it may be 
conceived as extremes of a continuum. In his view, tax compliance, as a specific social 
objective, will not necessarily be achieved by using deterrence measures of an economic 
nature (e.g., fines and inspections) and without jeopardizing the taxpayer's expected 
utility. 
According to Falkinger & Walther (1991), an effective tax system is made up of penalties 
and rewards, so the role of positive incentives is essential for tax compliance. In this 
sense, Falkinger & Walther (1991) introduce an innovation to the AS model – a reward, 
in the form of a tax refund or a reduction in the tax payable, for compliant taxpayers. This 
reward is seen as an incentive to tax compliance and, in the authors' analysis, it is desirable 
in the sense of contributing to the increase in well-being.  The authors also demonstrate 
that it is possible to combine the values of rewards and penalties, in such a way that the 
State's tax revenue remains unchanged. 
Cuccia (1994) reviews the literature on tax compliance, within the model of economic 
deterrence, encompassing the scope of Allingham & Sandmo's theory (1972). One of his 
criticisms is the fact that the initial works took certain parameters as exogenous when 
they could be treated as endogenous (e.g., probability of inspection). 
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Alm (1991) finds empirical evidence that if detection and punishment were the only 
factors influencing the taxpayer’s compliance behavior, the overall compliance level 
would be lower than observed, which can only be explained by the existence of social 
and psychological factors affecting tax compliance. Therefore, demonstrating the 
limitations of the classic economic paradigm. Hasseldine (2000) affirms that there is no 
empirical evidence supporting the predictions of economic deterrence models, in line with 
Feld & Frey (2004), that also believe that the traditional economic approach to tax evasion 
does not appear to successfully explain the extent of tax compliance.  
Considering the economic deterrence model and its deficiencies, it becomes apparent that 
further refinements and improvements are needed to be developed to address tax evasion 
and non-compliance. The following section examines alternative approaches that have 
been pursued under tax and social psychology models. 
2.3.2. Social Psychology Models 
Studies from a psychological perspective do not exclude economic issues, by involving 
aspects of the economic deterrence model and models of social psychology (Devos, 
2014). Social psychology studies the decision-making process in an environment where 
individual behavior is governed by its social norms (McKerchar, 2003). 
The first studies on social psychology models were presented by Schmölders (1959), who 
studied tax compliance from a mentality point of view, presenting the concept of tax 
mentality. According to the author, the taxpayer ‘s priority is his/her self-interest, rather 
than contributing to the interests of the community. Schmölders (1959) concludes that the 
taxpayer’s attitudes reflect cultural differences and the tax systems in which they are 
formed. 
Strümpel (1969) states that tax compliance is based on two variables, namely: i) 
taxpayers' good faith predisposition to the tax system and inspections; ii) tax 
measurements, assessment processes and bureaucracy in the relationship with tax 
authorities. 
Vogel (1974) and Song & Yarborough (1978) analyze the impact of taxpayers' ethical 
values on tax compliance, concluding that there is a significant correlation between 
personal beliefs and tax compliance. 
Following the build-up of tax psychology models over the previous decades, an important 
alternative version is offered by Ajzen & Fishbein (1980) and is referred to as the Theory 
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of Reasoned Action (TRA). TRA defines the link between the attitudes, beliefs, norms, 
intentions and behaviors of individuals. The behavior of an individual is determined by 
his behavioral intention to perform a certain action, which in turn, is determined by his 
attitudes and subjective norms, that is, the pressure that society exerts on an individual 
for him to practice a certain behavior. In short, the TRA model argues that behavioral 
intention is defined by two determining factors: firstly, by an individual's perception of a 
certain behavior, and secondly by the social pressure placed on an individual to perform 
a certain behavior. Still, within the TRA framework, Ajzen (1985) introduces a new 
assumption: the incorporation of volitional control as a determinant of intentions. The 
author argues that the behaviors are not always under total volitional control, and it may 
arise the possibility that a certain behavior will fail due to the (in)existence of several 
factors, called control beliefs. This new extension of TRA gave rise to a new theory called 
the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991; Madden et al., 1992 and Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 2005). 
The empirical work of Beck & Ajzen (1991) uses TPB as a tool for predicting 
honest/dishonest behaviors. According to Ajzen's (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior, 
the behavior of a given individual may be related to cognitive, emotional and behavioral 
components. Ajzen (1991) presents a theory of planned behavior, as an extension of the 
theory of rational action. The main difference in TPB vis-à-vis lies in the analysis of 12 
perceived behavioral controls with a relevant factor in determining the taxpayer’s 
behavior Nonetheless, Marandu et al. (2015) draw attention to the fact that TPB can fail 
to capture all the significant behavior determinants of tax compliance since it is a general 
theory, not specific to analyze tax compliance behavior. 
2.4 Tax Morals  
A review of the tax compliance literature shows that a significant number of studies have 
examined the relationship between tax morale and tax behavior (Devos, 2014). One of 
the pioneering studies, in the field of tax morals, is the one published by Schwartz & 
Orleans (1967), whose objective was to study, from a social point of view, the effect of 
the threat of sanctions compared to the awareness of individuals for tax compliance. 
Strümpel (1970) and Schmölders (1969) state that tax morality is understood as the 
intrinsic willingness of taxpayers to pay taxes. Later, Orviska & Hudson (2003) argue 
that the concept of tax morals consists of a civic duty, whose taxpayers are motivated by 
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a feeling of social responsibility and loyalty to the society in which they operate. 
Ultimately, tax morale is described by Alm & Torgler (2006), as the moral principles or 
values that individuals show concerning the fulfillment of their tax obligations. 
Tax morality is not inseparable from the cultural aspect inherent to each country. 
Countries possess their own culture, their values, their norms, which together influence 
taxpayers' behavior in tax compliance (Frey 1997). Another factor intrinsic to tax morals 
is the relationship of trust in governments and religion (institutional confidence). Studies 
developed by Torgler (2003) and Torgler & Murphy (2004), point out that the greater the 
trust in the governments and the levels of religiousness of the taxpayers, the greater the 
tax morale and, consequently, the greater the tax compliance. 
In studies carried out on tax compliance, tax morale has not always been considered a 
relevant variable, as it was understood to be part of the taxpayers' preferences (Feld & 
Frey, 2004). However, Torgler & Schneider (2009) argue that the practice of illegal 
behavior increases when taxpayers have low levels of tax morality, inducing the shadow 
economy problematic. Thus, tax morale becomes a relevant study variable. 
2.5 Tax Ethics 
Tax Ethics is the science that studies the tax, legislative and administrative morality of 
the exercise of public power and the behavior of taxpayers concerning taxes. The 
taxpayers' tax ethics should also be considered in the study of tax compliance, as it aligns 
taxpayers' beliefs and standards with their tax obligations (Van Brederode, 2020). 
Schwartz & Orleans (1967) were pioneers in the analysis of the relationship between tax 
ethics and tax compliance when they studied the effect between sanctions for non-
compliance and the appeal to conscience by taxpayers. With this study, it was concluded 
that the greater the economic power of the taxpayer, the greater the propensity to commit 
sanctions. Similarly, the appeal to conscience had further influence on tax compliance 
than the imposition of sanctions. Song & Yarbrough (1978) investigated the effect of 
taxpayer ethics on voluntary tax compliance. The results reveal that taxpayers who 
possess a high level of tax ethics believe that other taxpayers also comply with tax law, 
whereas taxpayers with a low level of tax ethics are more prone to non-compliance and 
believe that the remaining taxpayers would also breach tax law.  McGee (1998) describes 
three major views on the ethics of tax evasion: i) tax evasion is never ethical - individuals 
must pay whatever the State demands. This view is justified in a democracy by the theory 
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of consent, as part of the notion that the government role is played by specialists; ii) tax 
evasion is never unethical - there is never or rarely a duty to pay taxes, as the government 
would always be expropriating the wealth of individuals and it is not the duty of the 
population to give anything to a corrupt government. McGee (2006) labels this vision as 
an anarchist view, as the government would be a mere thief who confiscates society's 
wealth without its consent, arguing that there is no social contract signed between the 
parties; iii) tax evasion is sometimes ethical in certain circumstances and unethical in 
others - For McGee (2006), this view is the most widespread. However, there is no clear 
line regarding when evasion would be ethical or not. 
2.5.1 Determinants of Tax Ethics:  
There are countless determinants associated with non-tax compliance (Jackson & 
Millirion, 2002; Fischer et al., 1992; Richardson, 2006). These authors report in their 
studies that tax compliance can be influenced by demographic, economic, sociological 
and psychological factors. 
Next, it will be presented in more detail several determinants associated with non-tax 
compliance. 
2.5.1.1 Gender on Tax Ethics 
Gender is perhaps the most widely studied demographic variable, from the perspectives 
of economics, law, philosophy, political science, psychology, sociology, anthropology, 
religion, and history, to name a few (McGee, 2012). An early study from Tittle (1980) 
suggests that female contributors present a higher level of tax compliance. Other studies 
also found that women are more compliant when it comes to tax matters (Aitken & 
Bonneville, 1980; Mason & Calvin, 1978). Torgler (2003) and Martinez-Vazquez & 
Torgler (2009) affirm that female taxpayers are less prone to evade taxes. This is mainly 
due to differences in the ethical standards revealed by the female and male genders 
(Chung & Trivedi, 2003). Croson & Gneezy (2009) conclude that female taxpayers are 
more risk-averse. Kastlunger et al. (2010) note that the differences in tax behavior 
between genders are essentially due to issues related to social traits, self-image and 
biological differences of the sexes. Collymore (2020) also finds females to be more 
opposed to tax evasion than males. 
On the other hand, Hasseldine and Hite (2003) found no evidence of significant 
differences between men and women regarding their levels of tax ethics.  Several scholars 
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have predicted that as more women enter the work force and assume male positions, the 
differences between men and women will diminish when it comes to ethical decision 
making (Grasmick et al., 1984; Jackson & Milliron, 1986 ) 
2.5.1.2 Age on Tax Ethics 
According to McGee (2012), age is a demographic variable frequently examined in social 
science studies. Tittle (1980) concludes that taxpayers over the age of 30 possess higher 
levels of tax ethics than younger taxpayers. As age increases, taxpayers become more 
aware of the risk of sanctions and social exposure (Braithwaite, 2002). Andreoni et al. 
(1998) find in their research that older taxpayers and heads of households are more 
compliant, reasoning that the result obtained is explained by the fear of sanctions and 
social awareness. In line with this viewpoint, Richardson & Sawyer (2001) refer that the 
majority of the studies examining the age variable conclude that older people are more 
tax compliant. 
Contrarily, Clotfelter (1983) finds evidence that both younger and older taxpayers have 
the highest degree of compliance, by opposition to the middle-aged population. Porcano 
(1998) did not find a consistent relationship between age and tax evasion, suggesting that 
this demographic variable does not significantly influence tax evasion. Paz et al (2017) 
find that older taxpayers are more willing to engage in evasive behavior than younger 
taxpayers. 
2.5.1.3 Education Level on Tax Ethics 
Studies show that taxpayers with higher levels of education tend to be more compliant 
with tax duties than taxpayers with lower education, as they have a greater knowledge of 
the functioning and purpose of the tax system (Lewis, 1982; Jackson & Milliron (1986). 
Supporting this idea, Kasipillai et al. (2003) found statistical evidence suggesting a 
positive relationship between the level of education and tax compliance.  
Divergently, McGee (1998) characterizes education as an irregular variable, as taxpayers 
with a higher level of education tend to be more understandable with tax compliance but, 
on the other hand, they are also the taxpayers with the highest income and, consequently, 
with the highest tax burden, the reason why they may avoid taxes because they do not 
think the tax burden to which they are subject is fair. Due to their greater knowledge, 
educated taxpayers, also have more opportunities to find loopholes in the law to find 
opportunities for tax non-compliance (Torgler & Schneider 2009). Chan et al. (2000) 
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warn that a higher level of schooling may translate into greater preparation for tax 
management. 
2.5.1.4 Occupation on Tax Ethics 
Occupation is also presented as a justifying factor for tax compliance, with the variable 
being distinguished between the self-employed, employed and unemployed. Jackson & 
Milliron (1986); Andreoni et al. (1998) and Torgler (2003) state that the unemployed and 
the self-employed are more prone to tax evasion. As for the employed, since taxes are 
paid by the employer, the opportunities for tax non-compliance are reduced. Other authors 
also reached similar conclusions, confirming that self-employed workers are more likely 
to commit tax evasion. (Aitken & Bonneville, 1980; Groenland & Veldhoven, 1983; 
Houston & Tran, 2001). 
2.5.1.5 Religion on Tax Ethics 
One of the historical reasons found in tax literature to justify why people pay taxes is a 
sense of moral and religious obligation (Benk et al., 2015). Torgler (2006) finds religion 
to be a determining factor in the taxpayer’s motivation to pay taxes, concluding that the 
higher the taxpayers' religious beliefs, the higher the level of tax compliance. In the same 
vein, Torgler & Murphy (2004) find that in countries where there is a larger religious 
population, tax non-compliance is smaller Stack and Kposowa (2006) pinpoint the 





3. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
3.1 Research problem identification 
This research work aims to assess whether ethics is a determining factor that can be 
positively related to compliance or non-compliance with tax obligations, as well as to 
ascertain whether there are statistically significant differences within the scope of 
sociodemographic variables and religion. 
It is necessary, for competent treatment of the proposed research theme, a wide set of 
hypotheses for development (Devos, 2014). To ensure that the research problem 
presented is treated robustly, a holistic approach was used, which is more advisable for 
the treatment of the research problem (McKerchar, 2003 and Devos, 2014). 
3.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses  
The main goal of this dissertation is to answer the following research questions “The 
attitudes of Brazilian taxpayers on the ethics of tax evasion and their beliefs towards tax 
compliance are in line with the past literature findings?”, “Do Brazilians present high 
levels of tax ethics?” and “What are the determinants of tax ethics for Brazilian 
taxpayers?” 
To answer these research questions, several hypotheses were considered.  
H1: Are female taxpayers more likely to be ethical than male taxpayers in their attitudes 
towards tax evasion? 
H2: Are financial professionals more likely to be ethical than non-financial professionals 
in their attitudes towards tax evasion? 
H3: Are tax educated taxpayers more likely to be ethical than those who are not tax 
educated? 
H4: Are married taxpayers more likely to be ethical than non married in their attitudes 
towards tax evasion? 
H5: Are taxpayers with children more likely to be ethical than those who do not have 
children in their attitudes towards tax evasion? 
H6: Are non-self employed taxpayers more likely to be ethical than those who are self-
employed in their attitudes towards tax evasion? 
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H7: Are taxpayers with high religiosity levels more likely to be ethical than those who 
are not religious in their attitudes towards tax evasion? 
H8: Are taxpayers with higher income levels more likely to be ethical than those who 
have lower income in their attitudes towards tax evasion? 
H9: Are older taxpayers more likely to be ethical than younger taxpayers in their attitudes 




4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the methodology followed in the work is presented, with special detail for 
the data collection technique, the statistical instruments chosen for the respective analysis 
and the testing of the defined hypotheses. The chapter is organized in several parts: 2) 
procedures followed in data collection; 3) content of the questionnaire; 4) target 
population and sample and 5) quantitative methods used. 
4.2 Procedures followed in data collection  
The studies that address tax evasion and tax attitudes become complex to analyze since it 
is a sensitive topic to obtain reliable data. Taxpayers tend not to respond in a completely 
honest manner (Alm, 2012). Although this limitation exists, Kirchler & Wahl (2010) state 
that the questionnaire survey is one of the most used and most effective methods to 
analyze the level of tax compliance. The questionnaire also permits to gather objective 
results since information is collected without the intervention of the researcher (Lopes & 
Brites, 2016). 
In the present case, the questionnaire consists of closed-answer questions, considering 
that this type of question enables the coding of the answers and facilitates the analysis of 
the data obtained. (Saunders et al, 2009; Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). The questionnaire 
was disseminated through an online link in the platform Qualtrics distributed via e-mail 
and social media (Facebook and Linkedin) and there was no place for incomplete 
answers. 
4.3 Content of the questionnaire  
The questionnaire was divided into 5 Parts: 
Part A – Shadow Economy – The first part of the questionnaire addresses the term “cash 
in hand” - income paid in cash and not declared for tax purposes. The questions presented 
follow the suggestions of Onu (2017), as measuring the attitudes of respondents towards 
this tax issue is a challenge, as respondents do not always act according to the answers 
reported, a limitation also mentioned by Alm (2012). 
Part B - Tax Morals - Torgler & Murphy (2004) refer the relationship between 
government and citizens as one of the key elements for understanding tax morality. On 
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the other hand, the inclusion of tax morality as an analysis variable is justified by the fact 
that it is considered a key determinant of the shadow economy (Torgler, 2011; Daude, 
Gutierrez & Melguizo, 2013). 
Part C – Institutional Confidence - Institutional Confidence was measured by the 
degree of confidence in the following institutions: police, courts, government, political 
parties, federal senate and Brazilian IRS. 
Part D - Tax Ethics - In this part, a series of arguments that justify or not tax evasion are 
presented in 21 statements, where participants are asked “Tax evasion is ethical if …”, 
using a 5 point Likert scale, ranging between 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree.  
Part E - Socio-Demographic Data - Eight variables are identified and used abundantly 
in the literature: gender, age, marital status, religion, level of education, tax education, 
type of employment relationship and degree of comfort with income. 
4.4 Target Population and Sample  
The target population for this research work is made up of singular taxpayers’ resident in 
Brazil, which in 2020 amounted to 32 million people, according to the Receita Federal 
and Ministério da Economia. Regarding the sample, 227 responses were collected.  
In the application of the questionnaire, electronically, a non-casual sample was used. In 
this type of sample, the elements are chosen according to the degree of availability shown. 
This method has the advantage of being quick, easy and cheap (Hill & Hill, 2008). 
However, considering the sample used, any extrapolation to the population will be 
considered abusive and inappropriate. 
In terms of characterization of the sample, about 48.9% are male and 51.1% female. As 
for age, respondents are between 18 and 72 years old, with an average age of 35 years. 
At the age group level, the Clotfelter approach (1983) was followed, including only one 
new age group - up to 29 years old. About 44.9% of respondents are aged up to 29 years; 
34.8% are aged between 30 and 44 years old and 20.3% are older than 45 years old. 
Regarding marital status, the largest group of respondents is made up of single, divorced 
or widowed people, 60.8%. The rest, are married or in a stable relationship, corresponding 
to 39.2% of the sample. 
Regarding the level of education, the majority have attended university (97.4%) while the 
remainder (2.6%) of respondents did not. Despite the level of education being considered 
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an important factor to study ethics on tax compliance, the sample was not representative. 
Therefore, the schooling level was left out of the statistical analysis. In professional terms, 
83.7% are employed or retired, 8.8% are unemployed and 7.5% are studying or in another 
situation. Concerning the present or past professional situation, most respondents 
work/worked for others 79.7%, while 20.3% are self-employed. An important point, in 
the characterization of the sample, concerns the household income. Nevertheless, 
considering the reluctance of many respondents to answer questions of this nature, the 
question about household income was replaced by another question about the degree of 
comfort provided, according to the European Values Survey (EVS). In these terms, 
almost half of the respondents (47.6%) answered that the household income allows them 
to live comfortably. Concerning questions of a religious nature, our sample is mostly - 
118 respondents (52 %) - made up of people with a current positive feeling of belonging 
to a religion. Of the remaining respondents, 109 say they have not had a feeling of 
belonging to a religion in the past. 
4.5 Quantitative Methods 
The first phase of the empirical work consists of a descriptive analysis of the whole 
questionnaire, with the presentation of the frequency distribution for most of the 
questions, followed by a short commentary. 
The questions (also referred to as indicators) will then be grouped into dimensions. The 
indicators, components of each dimension, will be those that maximize Cronbach's alpha. 
The indicators in each dimension are subject to a Likert scale of five points, where 1 = I 
totally disagree and 5 = I totally agree. To highlight the robustness of the analysis, 
considering both the sample size and the thematic nature of the present research work, 
dimensions whose Cronbach's alpha is less than 0.60, value suggested by Marôco & 
Garcia-Marques (2006), Stephenson (2010) and Silva (2015), will not be considered. For, 
if this were to happen, the validity of the dimension would be questioned. The respective 
descriptive statistics: minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation will be 
presented for the dimensions created. The dimensions will be constructed through the 
arithmetic mean of the respective constituent indicators. A brief description of the 
dimensions will be carried out together with the creation of the dimensions. 
At a later stage, statistically significant differences between the various subgroups of the 
sample will be tested. Appendix B presents the list of sociodemographic and religious 
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variables and their subgroups. The statistical tests to be performed will be parametric and 
the type of test will always depend on the number of subgroups. 
With the execution of the PCA, the respective scores will be reserved, which represent 
the weighted (not arithmetic) average individual value for each dimension. The adequacy 
of the PCA will be verified with the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin and Bartlett sphericity tests. 
Using the standardized scores obtained with the PCA, a cluster analysis was then 
performed, which is an exploratory technique of multivariate analysis that allows subjects 
or variables to be grouped into homogeneous groups for one or more common 
characteristics. Subsequently, 3 multiple linear regression econometric models were 
created, to infer which variables have explanatory power of the 3 components of the "Tax 
Ethics" dimension obtained with the PCA analysis. 
The statistical treatment of the data was done through the Statistical Package for Social 




5. Analysis and Discussion of Results 
5.1. Descriptive analysis of the questionnaire  
This chapter aims to analyze and discuss the results. It integrates a descriptive analysis of 
the administered questionnaire and concatenates the indicators to create synthetic indices, 
or dimensions, which arise from the literature review.  
5.1.1 Shadow Economy 
For the analysis of the shadow economy problematic, the indicators in section A of the 
questionnaire were measured, which are presented in Table C.1 (see Appendix C), with 
the respective descriptive statistics. Both indicators present a mean above the center of 
the scale (3), which indicates a high level of discomfort of respondents regarding the 
theme of the shadow economy. 
The "Shadow Economy" index was then created through the arithmetic mean of the 
indicators (A1) and (A2), obtaining a Cronbach alpha of 0.79, considered to be a moderate 
level of reliability (George & Mallery, 2003 and Stephenson, 2010). The results show that 
the "Shadow Economy" dimension has a higher average than the center of the scale, 
revealing the discomfort of taxpayers regarding the payment and receipt through cash to 
evade taxes.  
Table 1 – T-Test Shadow Economy 
Control Variable Descriptive Statistics T Test 
P value 
Designation Subgroups Freq. Mean SD σx≠σy 
Gender 
Male 111 3,64 1,30 
-1,429 0,155 
Female 116 3,87 1,08 
Professional 
Area 
Others 129 3,62 1,21 
2,047** 0,042** 
Economics/Finance 98 3,94 1,15 
Tax Education 
Yes 81 3,75 1,19 
-0,023 0,982 
No 146 3,75 1,20 
Conjugality 
Yes 89 3,94 1,11 
1,904* 0,058* 
No 138 3,64 1,23 
Children 
No 151 3,68 1,21 
-1,448 0,150 
Yes 76 3,91 1,16 
Employment 
Relationship 
Self-Employed 45 3,51 1,24 
-1,495 0,140 
Employed 182 3,82 1,18 
Belonging to a 
Religion 
Yes 118 3,71 1,17 
-0,627 0,531 





Non comfortable 119 3,60 1,23 
2,074** 0,039** 
Comfortable 108 3,93 1,13 
*p<0,10; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
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Table 2 – Scheffé Test for Age – Shadow Economy 
Subgroups 
(years old) 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 
Freq. Mean SD F Bartlett Up to 29 30-44  
Up to 29  102 3,62 1,22 
1,355 0,697 
- - 
30-44  79 3,83 1,20 0,497 - 
≥45  46 3,93 1,10 0,327 0,892 
*p<0,10; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
Table 3 Scheffé Test for Level of Religiosity – Shadow Economy 
Subgroups 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 





Not religious 78 3,60 1,38 
1,32 6,44** 
- - 
Very religious 30 3,70 1,13 0,921 - 
Some religious 119 3,87 1,07 0,280 0,775 
*p<0,10; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
According to the results obtained, it is possible to note that the dimension is higher among 
females, those who live in conjugality, those who have children, those who are not self-
employed, those who do not currently belong to a religion, those who are over 45 years 
old, those who live comfortably, those whose professional area is related to the 
economic/financial field and those who identify themselves as being somewhat religious. 
Statistically, significant differences are found in the professional area, in conjugality and 
in the degree of comfort with the household income. It should also be noted that in the 
Scheffé test by the degree of religiosity, the hypothesis of equality of variances is rejected 
for a level of significance of 0.05. 
5.1.2 Tax Morals 
The second section of the questionnaire concerns tax morale. For its measurement, the 
indicators in section B of the questionnaire were measured, which are presented in Table 
C.2 (see appendix C), with the respective descriptive statistics. For the indicator - Tax 
Morals - the proposed sub-indicators present a lower mean than the center of the scale, 
meaning that, on average, respondents disapprove of the undue claim for tax benefits 
(B1), as well as the intentional tax evasion (B2), as well as the non-payment of the public 
transportation ticket (B3). 
The “Tax Morals” dimension was not created, as the Cronbach alpha was too low, 




5.1.3 Institutional Confidence 
“Institutional Confidence” was measured through the degree of trust in the following 
institutions: police, courts, government, political parties, federal senate and Brazilian IRS. 
The results are shown in Table C.3 (see Appendix C), allowing to conclude that 
respondents have a lower degree of confidence in institutions of a political nature when 
compared to non-political institutions. The institution with the highest level of confidence 
by respondents is the Brazilian IRS. 
The "Institutional Confidence" dimension was then created, measured based on the 
arithmetic mean of the indicators presented in Table C.3 (see Appendix C). The Cronbach 
alpha obtained was 0.77, showing a moderate level of reliability. Based on the results 
obtained, it can be concluded that the "Institutional Confidence" dimension presents an 
average below the center of the scale, revealing a feeling of distrust on the part of 
respondents towards national institutions. In comparative terms, "Institutional 
Confidence" was evaluated according to the various control groups, whose results are 
presented in tables 4 to 6. 
Table 4- T-Test – Institutional Confidence 
Variable Descriptive Statistics T-Test P-Value 
Designation Subgroups N Mean SD σx≠σy σx≠σy 
Gender 
Male 111 2,37 0,70 
2,055 0,041** 
Female 116 2,17 0,80 
Professional 
Area 
Others 129 2,23 0,81 
-0,864 0,389 
Economics/Finance 98 2,32 0,69 
Tax Education 
Yes 81 2,41 0,73 
2,116 0,036** 
No 146 2,19 0,77 
Conjugality 
Yes 89 2,26 0,71 
-0,083 0,934 
No 138 2,27 0,79 
Children 
No 151 2,34 0,79 
2,279 0,024** 
Yes 76 2,11 0,68 
Employment 
Relationship 
Self-Employed 45 2,14 0,77 
-1,203 0,233 
Employed 182 2,30 0,76 
Belonging to a 
Religion 
Yes 118 2,27 0,77 
-0,006 0,995 





Non comfortable 119 2,30 0,82 
0,738 0,461 
Comfortable 108 2,23 0,69 






Table 5 – Scheffé Test for Age – Institutional Confidence 
Subgroups 
(years old) 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 
Freq. Mean SD F Bartlett Up to 29 30-44 
Up to 29 102 2,36 0,82 
1,79  2,6152 
- - 
30-44 79 2,15 0,70 0,170 - 
≥45 46 2,26 0,72 0,752 0,724 
*p<0,10: ** p<0,05: *** p<0,01 
Table 6- Scheffé Test for Level of Religiosity – Institutional Confidence 
Subgroups 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 
Freq. Mean SD F Bartlett Not religious Very religious 
Not religious 78 2,25 0,73 
0,16 0,4622 
- - 
Very religious 30 2,34 0,75 0,864 - 
Some religious 119 2,26 0,79 0,996 0,882 
*p<0,10: ** p<0,05: *** p<0,01 
Through the analysis of tables V-4 to 6, it can be concluded that "Institutional 
Confidence" is similar between those who currently belong or not to a religion. Regarding 
the other control groups, “Institutional Confidence” is higher among men, among those 
who are tax educated, who do not live in conjugality, who are up to 29 years old, who do 
not live comfortably, who are very religious and who work on the economic/financial 
area. There are statistically significant differences between gender, tax education and 
whether the taxpayer is a parent or not. 
5.1.4 Tax Ethics 
For the analysis of Tax Ethics, the indicators in section D of the questionnaire were 
measured, which are presented in Table C.4 (see Appendix C), with the respective 
descriptive statistics. All the indicators, minus the one related with a Jew paying taxes 
while living in Nazi Germany (D15), present values below the center of the scale, meaning 
that, on average, the respondents strongly disagree or at least disagree with the arguments 
justifying tax evasion. Therefore, the participants present a high level of ethics towards tax 
evasion. 
The "Tax Ethics" index was then created through the arithmetic mean of the indicators 
(D1-D21), obtaining a Cronbach alpha of 0.94, considered to be a very high level of 
reliability (George & Mallery, 2003 and Stephenson, 2010). The results show that the 
"Tax Ethics" dimension presents a lower average than the center of the scale, which once 





Table 7- T-Test – Tax Ethics 
Variable Descriptive Statistics T-Test P-Value 
Designation Subgroups N Mean SD σx≠σy σx≠σy 
Gender 
Male 111 2,28 0,94 
3,162 0,002*** 
Female 116 1,92 0,78 
Professional 
Area 
Others 129 2,08 0,88 
-0,270 0,788 
Economics/Finance 98 2,11 0,88 
Tax Education 
Yes 81 1,97 0,81 
-1,633 0,104 
No 146 2,16 0,91 
Conjugality 
Yes 89 1,97 0,85 
-1,825 0,069* 
No 138 2,18 0,88 
Children 
No 151 2,19 0,88 
2,390 0,018** 
Yes 76 1,90 0,86 
Employment 
Relationship 
Self-Employed 45 2,33 0,88 
2,003 0,05** 
Employed 182 2,04 0,87 
Belonging to a 
Religion 
Yes 118 2,07 0,93 
-0,506 0,614 





Non comfortable 119 2,11 0,91 
0,259 0,796 
Comfortable 108 2,08 0,85 
p<0,10; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
Table 8- Scheffé Test for Age -Tax Ethics 
Subgroups 
(years old) 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 
Freq. Mean SD F Bartlett Up to 29 30-44 
Up to 29 102 2,25 0,88 
2,90* 0,11  
- - 
30-44 79 1,20 0,85 0,162 - 
≥45 46 1,93 0,89 0,122 0,913 
*p<0,10: ** p<0,05: *** p<0,01 
Table 9 – Scheffé Test for Level of Religiosity – Tax Ethics  
Subgroups 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 
Freq. Mean SD F Bartlett Not religious Very religious 
Not religious 78 2,23 0,81 
1,92 3,59 
- - 
Very religious 30 1,89 0,74 0,190 - 
Some religious 119 2,06 0,94 0,383 0,648 
*p<0,10: ** p<0,05: *** p<0,01 
According to the results obtained, it is possible to note the considerable difference in the 
level of tax ethics between men and women, with women possessing a higher level of 
ethics regarding tax evasion. Concerning the other control groups, the ones who are more 
ethical are the following: those who possess tax education, who live in conjugality, who 
are not self-employed, who currently belong to a religion, who are very religious, those 
who are between 30 and 44 years old, who live comfortably, who are not linked to the 
economic/financial area and who have children. There are statistically significant 
differences regarding gender, employment relationship, conjugality, whether they have 
children or not and age. 
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5.2 Robustness Analysis 
With the analysis and discussion of the various sections of the questionnaire and the 
creation of the respective dimensions, the PCA was carried out for each set of indicators 
capable of maximizing the Cronbach alpha. This procedure aimed to prove the 
unidimensionality of the dimension and the results are presented in Table D.1 (see 
Appendix D). 
It is possible to conclude that the PCA has statistically significant suitability for all 
dimensions. However, the results indicate that unidimensionality does not apply to the 
dimension "Tax Ethics" and the new dimensions proposed by the PCA are presented 
below. Note that the indicators belonging to section B do not constitute any dimension. 
5.2.1 Tax Ethics  
For the initial dimension called "Tax Ethics", the PCA identified three dimensions, 
presented in the following table. 
Table 10 – Tax Ethics - PCA 
Item 
Component 
Illegitimacy of Governments 
Moral reasons for not paying 
taxes 
Paying Taxes is a 
duty 
D15 ,826 -,038 -,055 
D17 ,798 ,027 ,042 
D10 ,784 ,023 ,182 
D5 ,772 -,052 ,126 
D20 ,762 ,157 ,064 
D11 ,748 ,020 ,347 
D3 ,728 ,275 ,285 
D13 ,718 ,208 ,349 
D8 ,642 ,370 ,136 
D12 ,602 ,300 ,419 
D4 ,602 ,305 ,289 
D18 ,561 ,371 ,050 
D2 ,049 ,862 ,139 
D1 -,018 ,840 ,197 
D7 ,081 ,733 ,333 
D21 ,212 ,664 ,416 
D19 ,279 ,594 ,356 
D16 ,409 ,478 ,451 
D14 ,138 ,338 ,795 
D9 ,185 ,358 ,790 
D6 ,179 ,271 ,763 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
With the interpretation of the indicators associated with components 1, 2 and 3, the 
components are now designated with the following nomenclatures: component 1 of 
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"Illegitimacy of Governments", component 2 of "Moral reasons for not paying taxes" and 
component 3 of "Paying Taxes is a duty". The respective Cronbach alphas are 0.931, 
0.876 and 0.867, whose reliability is moderate to high. The results are presented below. 
Table 11 – Tax Ethics – New Dimensions 
Indicator Freq. Min. Max. Mean SD 
Illegitimacy of Governments 227 1,00 5,00 2,38 1,11 
Moral reasons for not paying taxes 227 1,00 5,00 1,81 0,94 
Paying Taxes is a duty 227 1,00 5,00 1,53 0,90 
 
All the new dimensions, as well as the initial dimension, present an average below the 
center of the scale, meaning that on average, the respondents strongly disagree or at least 
disagree with the arguments justifying tax evasion.  
Nonetheless, it is clear from the new dimensions created that taxpayers disagree more 
notoriously with the arguments “moral reasons for not paying taxes” and “duty to pay 
taxes” when compared with the argument of the “illegitimacy of governments”.  
Statistical tests were carried out to infer the existence of statistically significant 
differences among the various control variables. Comparing the new dimensions with the 
initial one, "Tax Ethics", the statistically significant differences are presented in the table 
below. 






Moral reasons for 
not paying taxes 
Paying Taxes 
is a duty 
T-test T-test T-test T-test 
Gender *** ** *** *** 
Professional Area     
Tax Education   *** ** 
Conjugality * *   
Children ** ***  * 
Employment Relationship **  **  
Belonging to a Religion   *  
Degree of comfort with 
household income 
    
Age * **  * 
Level of Religiosity  **   
*p<0,10; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
Regarding component 1, the statistically significant differences are the same as in the 
initial dimension, except for the employment relationship and the level of religiosity. 
However, the “Illegitimacy of Governments” component loses some statistical 
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significance in the gender group when compared to the initial dimension. 
For the component “Moral reasons for not paying taxes”, the statistically significant 
differences in common with the initial dimension are those related to gender and 
employment relationship. When compared with the initial dimension, Component 2, 
presents statistical differences in tax education and whether one belongs to a religion. 
The statistically significant differences in common between component 3 and the initial 
dimension are related to gender, whether one has children and age. 
5.3 Clusters Analysis 




Moral reasons for not 
paying taxes 
Paying Taxes is a duty 





-,0259 ,907 1,994 ,724 -,976 ,516 
,977 ,596 -,395 ,545 -,367 ,606 
,229 ,966 ,641 ,939 1,869 ,816 
-,788 ,428 -,478 ,361 -,118 ,415 
Scale of the original variables: 1=completely agree; 5=completely agree 
 
Table 14 – Clusters Distribution 
Item  Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 
Male 9,9% 33,3% 23,4% 33,3% 
Female 12,9% 31,9% 6,9 48,3% 
Tax Educated 8,6% 35,8% 8,6% 46,9% 
Not Tax Educated 13,0% 30,8% 18,5% 37,7% 
Up to 29 years old 9,8% 40,2% 15,7% 34,3% 
30-44 years old 12,7% 24,1% 19,0% 44,3% 
More than 44 years old  13,0% 30,4% 6,5 50,0 
 
Through the analysis of table 13, it is possible to verify that cluster 2 is the one that most 
agrees with the argument of “Illegitimacy of Governments”, thus disagreeing with the 
other 2 arguments. Regarding the "Moral Reasons for not paying taxes" argument, the 
cluster with the highest level of agreement is cluster 1. Finally, cluster 3 is the one with 




Figure 1 – Cluster Analysis 
 
 
5.4 Analysis Of An Econometric Model 
A multiple linear regression econometric model was performed, with the 3 components 
of the PCA analysis as dependent variables; Illegitimacy of Governments (Model 1); 
Moral Reasons for not paying taxes (Model 2); and Paying taxes is a duty (Model 3). The 
Independent variables used were the following: Gender, Tax Education, Conjugality, 
Income, Children, Age, Degree of Religiosity, Clusters, Professional Area, Employment 
Relationship, Shadow Economy, Institutional Confidence and the Tax Ethics components 
extracted from the PCA analysis (see Table E.1, Appendix E) 
Table 15 – Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,783 ,613 ,579 ,649 2,225 
2 ,843 ,711 ,686 ,560 2,110 
3 ,836 ,698 ,672 ,572 1,973 
 
Table 16 – ANOVA – Multiple Linear Regression Model 
Model  Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 138,524 18 7,696 18,299 ,000 
Residual 87,476 208 ,421   
Total 226,00 226    
2 
Regression 160,659 18 8,926 28,413 ,000 
Residual 65,341 208 ,314   
Total 226,00 226    
3 
Regression 157,828 18 8,768 26,753 ,000 
Residual 68,172 208 ,328   
Total 226,00 226    
 
Through the analysis of the Durbin-Watson statistics presented in table 15, it is possible 
to note that the residuals of the 3 models are not correlated since they are all very close 







1 2 3 4
Illegitimacy of Governments Moral reasons for not paying taxes
Paying Taxes is a duty
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conclude that the degree of variation of the 3 Tax Ethics components is strongly explained 
by the independent variables. By analyzing the VIF values (see Appendix E), it is possible 
to conclude that the models do not present multicollinearity, since all VIF values are 
below 4. It is also possible to conclude, by analyzing the F statistics presented in Table 
16, that the model is, at a global level, for the 3 cases, statistically significant. (Brites, 
2016). 
Through the analysis of Table E.1 (Appendix E), it is possible to note that the only 
independent variables included in the estimation of Model 1 which possess a positive 
impact on the “Illegimitacy of Governments” argument as an ethical justification for tax 
evasion are the following: gender, tax education, employment relationship and the 
clusters. Contrary to the univariate analysis, only the clusters and Shadow Economy 
variables showed statistical significance 
In model 2, 12 of the 19 independent variables have a positive impact on the “Moral 
Reasons for not paying taxes” argument. The only exceptions are tax education, 
conjugality, degree of religiosity, employment relationship, shadow economy, 
illegitimacy of governments and paying taxes is a duty. In the same vein of the 
conclusions verified in the tests of differences of means presented previously, gender 
maintains its statistical significance. Cluster 1, cluster 3, belonging to a religion and 
shadow economy now also present statistical significance. 
In model 3, as in model 2, 12 of the 19 independent variables have a positive impact on 
the “Paying taxes is a duty” argument for tax evasion. In this model, only cluster 1 and 3 
present statistical significance, contrary to what was observed in the tests of differences 




6.1 Main Conclusions 
The main objective of this dissertation is to assess the attitudes of Brazilians towards the 
ethics of tax evasion and on a second level to analyze the influence of several socio-
demographic variables on tax ethics.  For that purpose, a questionnaire was applied, based 
on the tax ethics literature and previous studies. The sample obtained, consisting of 227 
responses, is not considered representative of the target population - the individual 
taxpayers living in Brazil. 
To achieve the objective of this work, empirical work was carried out in three phases. 
The first phase consisted of a descriptive analysis of the questionnaire. The descriptive 
analysis allowed the verification of the high degree of discomfort of taxpayers regarding 
the payment and receipt through cash to evade taxes and their disapproval of the undue 
claim for tax benefits. The descriptive analysis also revealed a feeling of distrust on the 
part of respondents towards national institutions and that the Brazilian taxpayers tend to 
present a high level of ethics towards tax evasion. This research work also contributed on 
the finding of the arguments that are more valued by taxpayers when trying to justify tax 
evasion, namely: an unfair tax system; if part of the tax revenue is used to finance a war 
that the taxpayer disapproves; if the taxpayer does not possess the means to pay the taxes 
due; and if the government discriminates the taxpayer in any way (race, religion, 
ethnicity). Subsequently, the dimensions associated with the research work and its 
analysis were created: Shadow Economy, Institutional Confidence and Tax Ethics. 
The second phase consisted, after the presentation of the dimensions, of inferring about 
the differences in means (t-test and Scheffé test) using the various control variables 
suggested by Devos (2014): gender; age, professional area; tax education; conjugality; 
employment relationship; belonging to a religion; degree of religiosity; degree of comfort 
with household income and whether or not someone had children. 
Concerning the "Tax Ethics" dimension, it was possible to conclude that gender is a 
determinant factor for the taxpayer’s level of ethics, becoming clear that women have 
higher levels of tax ethics, which is in line with past studies, such as the studies conducted 
by Torgler (2003), Martinez-Vazquez & Torgler (2009) and Tittle (1980). 
With this dissertation, it was also possible to conclude that age is a determinant factor for 
the taxpayers' level of ethics, being possible to verify that the individuals between 30-44 
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years old present higher values of tax ethics, which is in line with the studies conducted 
by Tittle (1980), Braithwaite (2002), Andreoni (1998) and Richardson & Sawyer (2001). 
Occupation is also a determinant factor for the tax ethics level, with the variable being 
distinguished between the self-employed, employed, and unemployed. Employed people 
are found to possess higher levels of tax ethics, which presents the same conclusions as 
previous studies done by Jackson & Milliron (1986); Andreoni et al. (1998) and Torgler 
(2003). 
Contrary to most of the literature, the religiosity level was not a determinant factor for the 
tax ethics level, with no evidence found that the ethics towards tax evasion was different 
between religious and non-religious people. 
With the realization of the PCA, it was concluded that it would make more sense to 
subdivide the dimension "Tax Ethics" by the three components suggested: "Illegitimacy 
of Governments", "Moral Reasons for not paying taxes" and "Paying taxes is a duty". The 
creation of these three new variables is one of the contributions of this work. 
The third phase of the empirical work consisted of evaluating, through a multiple linear 
regression model, which variables have explanatory power of the 3 components of the 
"Tax Ethics" dimension obtained with the PCA analysis. Overall, it was found that the 
degree of tax ethics is determined by the following variables: belonging to one of the 
clusters, gender, belonging to a religion and the level of discomfort of taxpayers towards 
the shadow economy problematic. 
6.2 Limitations 
Research work involving empirical studies is subject to several constraints, namely, those 
concerning the quality of the data collected and its respective treatment. After carrying 
out this research work, it is possible to highlight the following limitations: 
1) The sample, despite its considerable size (N=227), is not representative of the target 
population. It would be important to apply the questionnaire to a representative sample 
of the target population, which must be larger.  
2) The answers obtained in the questionnaires may, in some cases, be biased from the true 
perception of the respondent. This is a common problem when research is based on the 
application of questionnaires (Alm, 2012), as taxpayers may be ashamed or fear reprisals. 
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However, to overcome this limitation, respondents had full privacy when answering the 
questionnaire. 
3) Absence of the “Tax Morals” dimension, since its Cronbach alpha was very small, 
making its insertion in this dissertation unfeasible. 
4) Concerning the dimensions created, the "Shadow Economy" dimension consists of 
only two indicators, respecting the maximization of its Cronbach's alpha. It would be 
advisable to build the identified dimension with new indicators. 
6.3 Further Research 
This dissertation allowed the identification of a set of topics for future research, of which 
the following are highlighted: 
1) Considering the theme of this work, tax ethics is studied from the point of view of 
individual taxpayers living in Brazil. It would be relevant to study this interaction from 
the point of view of other players in the tax system, such as: non-resident Brazilian 
individual taxpayers, collective taxpayers residing in Brazil, taxpayers previously 
identified by the Federal Revenue Service as defaulters, among others; 
2) As already mentioned, one of the dimensions measured is only constituted by two 
indicators. It would be important, and interesting, to redefine this same dimension and to 
include new dimensions, such as Tax Morals, outside the spectrum of this dissertation, 
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Appendix A – Questionnaire 
Questionnaire Nr. ☐☐☐ 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to study the ethics of tax evasion to determine the impact on tax compliance 
of the IRPF. It must be answered by taxpayers subject to, and not exempt from, the IRPF collection, resident in 
the Brazilian territory. 
This questionnaire is part of a master's degree project in Finance developed at the Instituto Superior de Economia 
e Gestão (ISEG), of the University of Lisbon (UL). 
The instructions appear throughout the questionnaire. Please answer carefully and within the criteria presented. 
There are no right or wrong answers, with all of them being important for the study. 
The questionnaire is anonymous and data confidentiality is guaranteed. The answers will only be treated in 
aggregated form, thus not allowing the individual identification of the participants. 
For clarification of any questions or doubts, please contact via e-mail at andrembfonseca@gmail.com. 
We thank you in advance for your cooperation, without which this work would not be possible. 
A – Shadow Economy 
Below are some statements on compliance with tax obligations., which relate to an aspect of the shadow 
economy problematic. 
 
In this case, the statements relate to situations on which income is received in cash. Therefore, they constitute 
income paid in notes and coins, not declared to the Federal Revenue of Brazil (RFB). 
A1. Please indicate your degree of agreement for each of the statements below. 
Possible answers: SA = Strongly Agree; A = Agree; N = Neutral; D = Disagree; SD = Strongly Disagree. 
  SA A N D SD 
1 I find it unfair to work, constantly, receiving cash without paying taxes.      
2 It is unfair to make payments in cash in order not to pay taxes      
 
B – Tax Morals 
B.1 Please indicate your degree of agreement for each of the statements below. 
Possible answers: SA = Strongly Agree; A = Agree; N = Neutral; D = Disagree; SD = Strongly Disagree. 
  SA A N D SD 
1 It is justifiable to claim government and/or tax benefits for which we are not entitled      
2 It is justifiable to evade taxes if we have a chance      
3 It is justifiable not to pay the ticket for public transportation      
 
C – Institutional Confidence 
C.1. How confident are you of the following institutions? ST = Strongly Trust; T = Trust; N = Neutral; DT = 
Do not trust; SDT = I strongly do not trust  
  ST T N DT SDT 
1 Police      
2 Courts      
3 Government      
4 Political Parties      
5 Federal Senate      
6 Brazilian Internal Revenue Service (IRS)       
 
D.1. Please indicate your degree of agreement for each of the statements below. 
Possible answers: SA = Strongly agree; A = Agree; N =Neutral; D = Disagree; SD = Strongly Disagree. 
 Tax evasion/fraud is ethical... SA A N D SD 
1 Even though a large part of tax revenue is spent on fair cause projects      
2 Although a large part of the tax revenue is spent appropriately      
3 If the tax system is unfair      
4  If a large part of the tax revenue is spent on projects that I morally disapprove of      
5 If part of the tax revenue is to finance a war that I consider unfair      
6 If everyone does that      
7 Even though a large part of the tax revenue is spent on projects that benefit me      
8 If I can't pay the taxes due      




If the government discriminated against me in any way because of my religion, race 
or ethnicity 
     
11 
If a significant portion of tax revenue ends up in the pockets of corrupt politicians or 
their families and friends 
     
12 If tax rates are too high      
13 If a large part of the tax revenue is wasted      
14 If the probability of being caught is low      
15 If I was a Jew living in Germany during the Nazi regime during World War II      
16 
Because the government does not have the right to charge me so much (even if the 
tax figures are not too high) 
     
17 If I lived in a dictatorship      
18 If I lived in a state of emergency due to a health crisis (example: covid-19)      
19 Even if it means that if I pay less, others will pay more      
20 If the government conditioned the political opinion of the people      
21 
Even though a large part of the tax revenue is spent on projects that do not benefit 
me 
     
 
E - Socio-Demographic Data 
E1. Gender:  M •  F • 
E2. Age: ________ 
E3. Have you ever had any training in Taxes, Tax/Fiscal Law or any other area related to such areas? 
Yes •          No • 
E4. What is your current employment status?   Unemployed • Employed• 
E5. In your profession you... 
1 Work for a company, regardless of size.  
2 Self-employed  
3 Work in a family business or company, regardless of size.  
4 Another situation. What? ______________________________ 
E6. What is your professional area of expertise? 
1 Administration and Economics  
2 Financial Services  
3 Informatics and Information Technology  
4 Legal  
5 Marketing  
6 Architecture/Urbanism  
7 Human Resources  
8 Logistics/Operational  
9 Health and Wellness  
10 Engineering  
E7. Which of the following statements comes closest to your current income? 
1 Current income allows you to live comfortably  
2 The current income is enough to live on  
3 It is hard to live with your current income  
4 It is very difficult to live with your current income  
E8. What is your marital status? 
1 Single  
2 Married  
3 Divorced   
4 Widower  
E9. Number of children? 
1 0  
2 1  
3 2   
4 3  
5 More than 3  
E10. Regardless of your particular religion, you would say you are a person: 
Nothing religious •          Not very religious •          Very religious •       
E10.1. Do you currently have any religion? Yes •          No •   
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Appendix B - Subgroups 
I. Table B.1 - " Sociodemographic variables and their subgroups”  
Sociodemographic variable Subgroups 




















Belonging to a Religion 
Yes 118 
No 109 
Degree of comfort with household 
Income 
Non comfortably 119 
Allows to live Comfortably 108 
Degree of Religiosity 
Not religious 78 





Up to 29 years 102 
30-44 years 79 





Appendix C – Descriptive Statistics 
Table C.1 – Shadow Economy 
 
Table C.2 – Tax Morals 
 
Table C.3 – Institutional Confidence 
 
Table C.4 - Tax Ethics 




I think it is unfair to work, constantly, 
receiving in cash without paying taxes 
227 1 5 3,65 1,34 
0,79 
A2. 
It is unfair to make payments in cash in order 
not to pay taxes 
227 1 5 3,86 1,29 
Shadow Economy 227 1 5 3,76 1,19  




It is justifiable to claim government and/or tax 
benefits for which we are not entitled 
227 1 5 1,58 1,16 
0,58  B2. 
It is justifiable to evade taxes if we have a 
chance 
227 1 5 1,70 1,11 
B3. 
It is justifiable not to pay the ticket for public 
transport 
227 1 5 2,14 1,34 
Item Freq. Min. Max. Mean SD 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
C1 Police 227 1 5 2,68 1,20 
0,77 
C2 Courts 227 1 5 2,71 1,22 
C3 Government 227 1 5 1,87 1,11 
C4 Political Parties 227 1 4 1,50 ,86 
C5 Federal Senate 227 1 5 1,91 1,05 
C6 Brazilian Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 227 1 5 2,92 1,26 
Institutional Confidence 227 1 4,17 2,27 ,76  




Even though a large part of tax revenue is 
spent on fair cause projects 
227 1 5 1,77 1,24 
0,94 
D2 
Even though a large part of the tax revenue is 
spent appropriately 
227 1 5 1,78 1,24 
D3 If the tax system is unfair 227 1 5 2,26 1,41 
D4 
If a large part of the tax revenue is spent on 
projects that I morally disapprove of 
227 1 5 2,16 1,34 
D5 
If part of the tax revenue is to finance a war 
that I consider unfair 
227 1 5 2,44 1,53 
D6 If everyone does that 227 1 5 1,59 1,08 
D7 
Even though a large part of the tax revenue is 
spent on projects that benefit me 
227 1 5 1,67 1,09 
D8 If I cannot pay the taxes due 227 1 5 2,56 1,45 
D9 If I was sure I'd never get caught 227 1 5 1,51 ,97 
D10 
If the government discriminated against me in 
any way because of my religion, race or 
ethnicity 
227 1 5 2,47 1,52 





in the pockets of corrupt politicians or their 
families and friends 
D12 If tax rates are too high 227 1 5 2,05 1,30 
D13 If a large part of the tax revenue is wasted 227 1 5 2,20 1,39 
D14 If the probability of being caught is low 227 1 5 1,50 ,99 
D15 
If I was a Jew living in Germany during the 
Nazi regime during World War II 
227 1 5 3,04 1,69 
D16 
Because the government does not have the 
right to charge me so much (even if the tax 
figures are not too high) 
227 1 5 2,22 1,39 
D17 If I lived in a dictatorship 227 1 5 2,57 1,55 
D18 
If I lived in a state of emergency due to a 
health crisis (example: covid-19) 
227 1 5 2,37 1,47 
D19 
Even if it means that if I pay less, others will 
pay more 
227 1 5 1,61 ,99 
D20 
If the government conditioned the political 
opinion of the people (e.g. oppressed press) 
227 1 5 2,15 1,35 
D21 
Even though a large part of the tax revenue is 
spent on projects that do not benefit me 
227 1 5 1,80 1,22 
Tax Ethics 227 1 5 2,10 ,88  
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Appendix D – PCA Results 
 
Table D.1 - PCA Results  









0,500 124,849*** 82,656 0,827 2 Yes 
Institutional 
Confidence 
0,737 352,259*** 46,842 0,289 6 Yes 
Tax Ethics 0,930 3179,377*** 65,021 0,455 21 No 




Appendix E – Regression Analysis 
 










Model  B Std Error Beta T Sig Tolerance VIF 
1 
Constant -0,546 0,227  -2,403 0,017   
Gender 0,004 0,098 0,002 0,045 0,964 0,765 1,307 
Tax 
Education 
0,032 0,094 0,015 0,343 0,732 0,910 1,099 
Conjugality -0,098 0,105 -0,048 -0,932 0,352 0,704 1,421 
Income -0,034 0,090 -0,017 -0,376 0,708 0,909 1,100 
Kids -0,081 0,136 -0,038 -0,597 0,551 0,452 2,213 
Up to 29 -0,121 0,161 -0,060 -0,752 0,453 0,289 3,460 
From 30 to 
44 
-0,217 0,135 -0,104 -1,613 0,108 0,450 2,221 
Some 
religious 
-0,025 0,121 -0,012 -0,202 0,840 0,508 1,968 
Very 
religious 
-0,087 0,131 -0,030 -0,665 0,507 0,937 1,067 
Cluster 1 0,482 0,245 0,154 1,970 0,050** 0,305 3,276 
Cluster 2 1,709 0,110 0,803 15,548 0,000*** 0,698 1,433 
Cluster 3 1,064 0,229 0,381 4,656 0,000*** 0,278 3,591 
Professional 
Area 
-0,079 0,097 -0,039 -0,809 0,420 0,795 1,258 
Employment 
Relationship 
0,049 0,116 0,019 0,420 0,675 0,872 1,147 
Belonging 
Religion 
-0,018 0,051 -0,017 -0,355 0,723 0,860 1,162 
Shadow 
Economy 
-0,115 0,050 -0,115 -2,293 0,023** 0,744 1,345 
Institutional 
Confidence 





-0,024 0,080 -0,024 -0,300 0,765 0,289 3,457 
Paying taxes 
is a duty 
-0,053 0,078 -0,053 -0,680 0,497 0,302 3,308 
2 
Constant -0,637 0,194  -3,282 0,001***   
Gender 0,185 0,084 0,093 2,204 0,029** 0,783 1,277 
Tax 
Education 
-0,126 0,081 -0,061 -1,557 0,121 0,920 1,087 
Conjugality -0,101 0,091 -0,049 -1,112 0,268 0,705 1,418 
Income 0,031 0,078 0,015 0,395 0,693 0,909 1,100 
Kids 0,169 0,117 0,080 1,446 0,150 0,456 2,195 
Up to 29 0,097 0,139 0,048 0,698 0,486 0,289 3,461 
From 30 to 
44 
0,095 0,117 0,046 0,817 0,415 0,446 2,241 
Some 
religious 
0,129 0,104 0,064 1,237 0,217 0,512 1,954 




Cluster 1 2,292 0,142 0,731 16,091 0,000*** 0,673 1,487 
Cluster 2 0,051 0,140 0,024 0,363 0,717 0,323 3,097 
Cluster 3 1,069 0,194 0,382 5,514 0,000*** 0,289 3,460 
Professional 
Area 
0,080 0,084 0,040 0,948 0,344 0,796 1,256 
Employment 
Relationship 
-0,097 0,100 -0,039 -0,971 0,333 0,875 1,143 
Belonging 
Religion 
0,076 0,044 0,070 1,753 0,081* 0,873 1,146 
Shadow 
Economy 
-0,178 0,042 -0,178 -4,249 0,000*** 0,788 1,269 
Institutional 
Confidence 




-0,018 0,060 -0,018 -0,300 0,765 0,387 2,582 
Paying taxes 
is a duty 
-0,092 0,068 -0,092 -1,365 0,174 0,304 3,286 
3 
Constant -0,469 0,201  -2,338 0,020   
Gender -0,023 0,087 -0,011 -0,260 0,795 0,766 1,306 
Tax 
Education 
-0,063 0,083 -0,030 -0,762 0,447 0,912 1,097 
Conjugality 0,015 0,093 0,007 0,159 0,874 0,701 1,426 
Income -0,016 0,080 -0,008 -0,204 0,839 0,909 1,100 
Kids 0,131 0,120 0,062 1,094 0,275 0,454 2,204 
Up to 29 0,228 0,141 0,114 1,613 0,108 0,292 3,427 
From 30 to 
44 
0,036 0,120 0,017 0,303 0,762 0,445 2,248 
Some 
religious 
0,108 0,107 0,054 1,014 0,312 0,510 1,959 
Very 
religious 
0,038 0,116 0,013 0,328 0,743 0,936 1,069 
Cluster 1 -0,592 0,214 -0,189 -2,767 0,006* 0,311 3,219 
Cluster 2 -0,164 0,142 -0,077 -1,155 0,250 0,325 3,080 
Cluster 3 2,121 0,153 0,759 13,889 0,000*** 0,486 2,057 
Professional 
Area 
0,061 0,086 0,031 0,714 0,476 0,795 1,259 
Employment 
Relationship 
0,104 0,102 0,042 1,023 0,307 0,876 1,142 
Belonging 
Religion 
0,029 0,045 0,027 0,652 0,515 0,862 1,161 
Shadow 
Economy 
-0,042 0,045 -0,042 -0,948 0,344 0,728 1,373 
Institutional 
Confidence 









-0,096 0,071 -0,096 -1,365 0,174 0,292 3,428 
* p < 0,10; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01 
